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RECENT CASES

The fifth situation is when the decree awards complete legal title to
the custodial parent. In the absence of any indication to the contrary, the
custodial parent would receive full credit for lodging support because it
is contemplated that as owner she is entitled to exclusive use and possession of the property. 30
Missouri attorneys and judges should carefully weigh the tax implications of Pugel when drafting separation agreements and decrees of dissolution. In so doing they can control the allocation of lodging support and
often determine which parent can claim dependency exemptions.
GARRET R. CROUCH II

WILLS-DIRECTION IN WILL TO DESTROY ESTATE
PROPERTY VIOLATES PUBLIC POLICY
Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Assoc.1
Testatrix directed in her will that her house be razed and the land
upon which it was located be sold, the proceeds to become part of the
residue of her estate. Neighboring lot owners and trustees of the subdivision2 appealed from the denial of their petition seeking an injunction
to prevent destruction of the house. 3 Plaintiffs contended that razing the
house would violate the terms of the trust indenture, create a private
nuisance, and be contrary to public policy. The St. Louis District of the
Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that to allow the
4
house to be destroyed would violate public policy.
A Missouri statute provides that all courts shall give due regard to
the testator's intention and directions in a will.5 This policy, coupled
with the basic right of owners to the exclusive possession and control of
their property, 6 establishes the substantial freedom of a testator in the
30. O'Connor v. Comm'r, 32 CGH Tax Ct. Mem. 156 (1973).
1. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
2. The house was located at #4 Kingsbury Place in St. Louis. Kingsbury
Place is a "private place" established in 1902 by a trust indenture. The indenture
limits the type and quality of the structures that may be constructed by the owners. The trustees are empowered to protect the area from encroachment, trespass,
nuisance, or injury, and the indenture empowers both the lot owners and the
trustees to bring suit to enforce the covenants.
3. The trial court had dissolved the temporary restraining order and decided all issues against the property owners and trustees.
4. The majority did not reach the issues whether the provision of the will
violated the restrictions in the trust indenture and whether enforcement of the
provision would create an actionable private nuisance. The dissent would have
decided these issues against the plaintiffs. 524 S.W.2d at 219.
5. § 474.430, RSMo 1969.
6. Lastofka v. Lastofka, 339 Mo. 770, 790, 99 S.W.2d 46, 58 (1936); City
of Fredericktown v. Osborn, 429 S.W.2d 17, 22 (St. L. Mo. App. 1968); Reutner v.
Vouga, 367 S.W.2d 34, 42 (St. L. Mo. App. 1963).
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disposition of his property.7 However, this right to dispose freely of one's
property is not absolute. The right is created by statute, and therefore the
state may foreclose the right completely or place such limitations on it
as it deems proper.8 One such limitation established by the courts is
that the intention of the testator will not be carried out if it violates an established rule of law or public policy.9
The term "public policy" is neither precise nor easily defined. One
definition frequently quoted by Missouri courts is that public policy is
that principle of law which declares that "no one can lawfully do that
which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public
good."o The courts state that the term is synonymous with "the public
good" and "policy of the law."1 ' They also state that the public policy
of Missouri is to be determined from the state's constitution, laws, and
judicial decisions and not from the judges' personal opinions of what
the public interests are.' 2 Unless a will provision contravenes "some positive, well-defined expression of the settled will of the people of the state
or nation, as an organized body politic," courts should exercise extreme
caution in holding it void as against public policy. 13
In their basic approach to the principle of public policy, Missouri
courts are in accord with all other jurisdictions14 and the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts.15 Therefore, although the situation in Eyerman had
not arisen before in Missouri, 16 the decisions of other jurisdictions as to
7
similar provisions provide persuasive precedent.'
7. Teller v. Kaufman, 426 F.2d 128, 181 (8th Cir. 1970); Geyer v. Bookwalter, 193 F. Supp. 57, 61 (W.D. Mo. 1961); In re Raln's Estate, 316 Mo. 492,
502-03, 291 S.W. 120, 124, cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).

8. State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte, 275 Mo. 298, 314, 204 S.W. 806, 808
(En Banc 1918)..

9. Teller v. Kaufman, 426 F.2d 128, 131 (8th Cir. 1970); Geyer v. Bookwalter, 193 F. Supp. 57, 61 (W.D. Mo. 1961); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Ruh.
land, 359 Mo. 616, 621, 222 S.W.2d 750, 752 (1949); In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo.

492, 503, 291 S.W. 120, 124, cert. denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).
10. Brawner v. Brawner, 327 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Mo. En Banc 1954), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 964 (1960); Dille v. St. Luke's Hospital, 355 Mo. 436, 446, 196 S.W.2d
615, 620 (1946); In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 500, 291 S.W. 120, 122, cert.

denied, 274 U.S. 745 (1927).
11. Cases cited note 10 supra.
12. In re Rahn's Estate, 316 Mo. 492, 501, 291 S.W. 120, 123, cert. denied,

274 U.S. 745 (1927).
13. Id.
14. 57 Am. JUR,, Wills, § 1134 (1948).
15. A trust or a provision in the terms of a trust is invalid if the enforcement of the trust or provision would be against public policy, even though
its performance does not involve the commission of a criminal or tortious
act by the trustee.
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959). In comment K following this
section it is stated that it is against public policy to carry out the testator's directions if the result would be either detrimental to the community or capricious.
16. Past Missouri court decisions applying public policy arguments to invalidate will provisions have usually involved unreasonable restraints on marriage or
interference with freedom of religion.
17. In Schulte v. Missionaries of La Salette Corp. of Mo., 352 S.W.2d 636,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/15
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In Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown' s the Supreme Court of Errors of
Connecticut refused to uphold a provision in a will which restricted the
duration of leases of the property devised to one year and provided that
no buildings erected on the property exceed three stories in height. The
court stated that the testator's only purpose was to require the property
to be managed according to his own peculiar ideas. The court based its
finding that the provision was contrary to public policy on three factors:
the property was located in the city's business district, the restrictions in
the will would prevent the trustees from obtaining suitable tenants, and
carrying out the testator's intention would seriously hinder the city's
growth and development. The court therefore concluded that to carry
out the testator's intention would be detrimental to both beneficiaries
under the will and the public. 19
In In re Scott's Will 2o a provision in a will directed the executor to
destroy all money or other evidence of credit belonging to the estate. The
Minnesota Supreme Court held the provision void as against public
policy.
In Brown v. Burdett21 the testatrix directed that all but four rooms
of her house be blocked up for twenty years. The Chancery Division,
frowning upon such a useless disposition of property, held that the provision violated public policy.
In M'Caig's Trustees v. Kirk-Session of United Free Church of Lismore2 2 the testatrix directed that M'Caig Tower be converted into a private
enclosure and that statues of her family be placed inside. There were
no living descendants of the family to visit the area, and the public
was prohibited from doing so. The court discussed the fact that no
beneficiary had a right to enforce the provision for the erection of the
statues. The court concluded that, although the testatrix could not have
been prevented from doing this during her lifetime,2 3 the provision was
nevertheless contrary to public policy 24 and therefore invalid.2 5
638-39 (Mo. 1961), the court stated that where there is no applicable legislation
the courts have the power and duty to declare the state's public policy looking
to all available sources including authorities outside the state.
18. 105 Conn. 261, 135 A. 555 (1926).
19. The basic facts of this case are utilized in an example in the Restatement

(Second) of Trusts, as an illustration of a provision, which, if performed, would
be injurious to the community and to the beneficiary and therefore invalid. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (v)(1959).
20. 88 Minn. 386, 93 N.W. 109 (1903).
21. 21 Ch. D. 667 (1882).
22. [1915] Sess. Cas. 426 (Scot.).
23. In Egerton v. Brownlow, 10 Eng. Rep. 359 (H.L.C. 1853), the court
stated that an owner of property may do many things himself which he cannot
require his successor to do where it is against public policy to so use the property.
24. The court stated that the bequest was contrary to public policy because
it involved a "sheer waste of money" and pointed out that during a man's lifetime he is usually restrained from such wasteful expenditures by a desire to enjoy and increase his property. The court also stated it was "dangerous to support
a bequest that can only gratify the vanity of testators." 10 Eng. Rep. at 434.
25. An executor is ordinarily permitted to carry out a direction in a will to

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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Two common elements are present in these cases. First, each contested will provision involved the destruction or wastage of property,
which the Restatement (Second) of Trusts calls a capricious and noncharitable purpose.2 6 This element is clear in Scott's Will, Burdett, and

M'Caig's Trustees, but is also present in Colonial Trust, because materially
hampering the development of the city's business district is equivalent to
wasting property. The second characteristic present in all four cases is
the absence of a definite beneficiary. This is important because, absent
a definite beneficiary, there is no tangible benefit which could outweigh
the harm to the public resulting from the destruction or wastage of
property. Whenever these two elements are present, courts are justified
2
in overriding a testator's intention on the basis of public policy. 7
The Eyerman court, after concluding that plaintiffs had standing 28
erect a monument on testator's grave suitable to the testator's means and station
in life. Thus, in Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. (10 Stew.) 347 (1883), a trust
to buy a burial plot and erect a monument thereon was held valid. See also
Odom v. Langston, 355 Mo. 115, 195 S.W.2d 466 (1946); Wendell v. Hazelwood
Cemetery, 3 N.J. Super. 457, 67 A.2d 219 (1949); RESTATEMfENT (SECOND) oF.TRUSTS
§ 124 (1959); SIMES AND SMrrH ON FUTURE INTEREsTS § 1394 (1973 Supp.); Fratcher,
Bequests for Purposes, 56 IowA L. REv. 773, 780-83 (1971).

26.
tinues:

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRuSTs

§ 124 (g), at 266. The comment Con-

It is impossible to draw a clear line between purposes which are capri.
cious and those which are not. A purpose is not capricious merely because
no living person benefits from its performance, provided it satisfies a
natural desire which normal people have with respect to the disposition
of their property. Thus, such purposes as the erection or maintenance of
tombstones or the care of dogs, is not capricious unless the value of the
property to be devoted to these purposes is unreasonably large. On the
other hand, it is capricious to provide that money shall be thrown into
the sea or that a field shall be sowed with salt or that a house shall be
boarded up and remain unoccupied. Public policy may forbid the creation

of a power where no one benefits by the exercise of the power and the
donee of the power does not lose anything by its exercise. Although a person may deal capriciously with his own property, his self-interest ordinarily will restrain him from so doing. Where an attempt is made to
confer such a power upon a person who is given no other interest in the
property, there is no such restraint and it is against public policy to
allow him to exercise the power if the purpose is merely capricious.
Id. at 267.
27. Id.

28. The court noted that the plaintiffs were not invoking the rights of the
beneficiaries under the will, but were seeking protection of their own competing
interests and the interests of the community. 524 S.W.2d at 212. It further stated
that the test to be applied in determining whether plaintiffs have standing to

raise the public policy issue is "whether the challenged action will cause plaintiffs injury in fact, and whether the injury is within the 'zone of interests'
created by statutes which plaintiffs contended were being violated." Id. at 213.
There must be some connection between the provision challenged and the alleged injury if the test is to be met. Coalition for the Environment v. Volpe, 504
F.2d 156, 165 (8th Cir. 1974). Satisfying the test as legally protectible interests are
aesthetic, environmental and economic interests. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405U.S. 727, 734 (1972). See also Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss2/15

4

1976]

Wear: Wear: Wills--Direction in Will to Destroy Estate Property Violates Public Policy
RECENT CASES

to challenge the will, discussed several factors which led it to conclude that
the provision violated public policy. The court said that the estate would
suffer a loss 29 and adjacent property values would decline.30 The court also
stated that the fact that the area where the property was located had been
designated as a landmark by the St. Louis Commission on Landmarks
and Urban Design demonstrated the importance of preserving the area
intact. 31 The court emphasized that there was a need for dwelling units
in St. Louis.3 2 The court also said that the devise was not one of land
to definite beneficiaries, but one of cash to be distributed as part of the
residue of the estate. In addition, no purpose or reason was suggested for
carrying out the will's provisions. Finally, the court relied on the decisions from other jurisdictions previously discussed and the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts in reaching its conclusion that such a senseless waste
of property cannot be tolerated where there are no offsetting benefits.
The dissent in Eyerman said that there was no basis for the court's
holding that the razing would be contrary to public policy, and that the
case was not a proper one for court-defined public policy. The dissent
argued that an owner has exclusive control of his land as long as he
does not impair another's right to enjoy his property and that razing
the house would not impair plaintiffs' right to the enjoyment of their
properties. The dissent also emphasized that the testatrix' intention should
not be defeated unless it clearly prejudices the public interest.33
As stated earlier, each of the cases relied on by the Eyerman court
involve both a destruction or wastage of property and an absence of a
definite beneficiary. These two elements were also present in Eyerman.
Therefore, it would seem that the court's decision is in accord with other
jurisdictions which have dealt with similar factual situations.
Although the court mentioned these two factors, it also seemed to
emphasize other factors as being even more important. It stressed such
factors as a loss in value of neighboring property, the designation of the
surrounding area as a landmark, and the need for dwelling units in the
city. Although seemingly relevant, these factors are not of the type that
would justify directly contravening the testatrix' unambiguous intention. 34
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Association of Data Processing Service Organizations v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
29. 524 S.W.2d at 213. The value of the house and lot was $40,000, whereas
the value of the lot alone was only $5,000. With the cost of demolition being
$4,350, the estate would lose $39,350 if the intention of the testatrix were carried
out.
30. Id. The court stated that the value of the adjoining properties would
depreciate $10,000.
31. Id. at 213. The dissent pointed out that this action by the Commission
was prompted by the application of several residents of Kingsbury Place and
that it did not take place until after the testatrix' death. Id. at 219.
32. Id. at 214.
33. The dissent objected to the court conferring a benefit upon testamentary beneficiaries and the city, both nonparties to the suit. Id. at 218.
34. In Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407 (1941), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania stated:
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